Changing expectations: How the rule of law fared in the first decade of the Hong Kong SAR by Gittings, DJ
Title Changing expectations: How the rule of law fared in the firstdecade of the Hong Kong SAR
Author(s) Gittings, DJ
Citation Hong Kong Journal, 2007, n. 7
Issued Date 2007
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/193250
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Changing Expectations: How the Rule of Law Fared in the First Decade 
of the Hong Kong SAR. 
By Danny Gittings1 
It’s all too easy to forget the apocalyptic predictions about the future of 
the rule of law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) 
that were so common a decade or so ago. Or how many forecast that July 1, 
1997 would mark the beginning of the end of Hong Kong’s separate legal 
system. 
Take, for instance, then-Democratic Party leader Martin Lee’s 1995 
prediction that restrictions on the Court of Final Appeal’s composition and, 
especially, on its jurisdiction “rips the rule of law into shreds”  and would 
allow Chinese state-owned companies to flout the law with impunity.2 That 
pessimistic forecast, like so many others, has proved far off the mark as the 
first decade of the HKSAR saw the new court instead successfully establish 
itself as a guardian of Hong Kong’s civil liberties. 
Add the gradually diminishing number of controversies about the Hong 
Kong government’s respect for the rule of law as the decade wore on and it’s 
fair to say that the rule of law—at least when considered strictly in terms of 
respect for judicial independence and the legal process—survived the first 
10 years of the HKSAR far better than many had expected.3 
But real threats did emerge during that decade, especially due to the 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) repeated use of 
its power to interpret the Hong Kong Basic Law, the de facto constitution. 
And changing expectations also played a part in that generally rosy picture, 
transforming some issues that had been denounced as outrageous affronts to 
the rule of law during the late 1990s into widely accepted facts of life in the 
new millennium. 
Perhaps the clearest example was the comparative lack of outrage over 
the October, 2006 trial of five Hong Kong men in a Shenzhen court for the 
murder, four years earlier, of Hong Kong tycoon Harry Lam in the Luk Yu 
tea house in Hong Kong’s Central business district.4 In stark contrast to 
similar cases in the past, few bothered to ask why the accused were standing 
trial in a mainland court under Chinese law, instead of being sent back to 
face justice in the jurisdiction where the killing had occurred. 
Chilling Precedents 
There was none of the controversy that surrounded the “Big Spender” 
case in 1998, when Hong Kong gangland boss Cheung Tze-keung and 
several of his followers were arrested and ultimately executed after being 
tried in a Guangzhou court for kidnappings and other crimes carried out 
primarily in Hong Kong. 
However horrendous Mr. Cheung’s crimes, legislators and prominent 
lawyers warned then that it set a “chilling precedent”5 for the future of Hong 
Kong’s separate legal system if China could circumvent the restrictions on 
how national laws should apply in Hong Kong6 by simply trying suspects 
caught on the mainland in its own courts rather than return them for trial in 
Hong Kong.7 Then-Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung admitted that the 
controversy over the “Big Spender” case had shaken public confidence in 
Hong Kong’s judicial system. Her 1998 refusal to seek the return of the 
suspects for trial in Hong Kong was widely portrayed as a black mark for the 
rule of law in the early years of the HKSAR.8 
Fast forward almost a decade and what was condemned as a chilling 
precedent in 1998 is now generally accepted as inevitable. Although the 
Shenzhen trial of one of Hong Kong’s most famous murder cases in recent 
years was predictably big news in the local media, there was hardly any 
interest in the jurisdiction issue. Newspaper editorials criticizing China’s 
insistence on trying the Luk Yu tea house case were conspicuous by their 
absence. So too were the concerned Legislative Council hearings that took 
place over “Big Spender.”9 All this despite the fact that evidence in this 
more recent case argued far more strongly in favor of a Hong Kong trial than 
had been true in 1998.10 
Much the same can be said of the NPCSC’s exercise of its ultimate 
power of interpretation under Article 158(1) of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
That too was widely seen as a chilling precedent when it first occurred at the 
request of then-Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in 1999, to reverse the 
effects of two Court of Final Appeal judgments which it was feared would 
open the floodgates to an influx of children born in China. On that occasion, 
outraged legislators from the democratic camp dressed in black to mourn 
what they called the “death of the rule of law” in Hong Kong. 
But the NPCSC went on to interpret the Hong Kong Basic Law twice 
more during the first decade of the Hong Kong SAR. In 2004, it intervened 
to help Mr. Tung resist pressure for rapid moves toward more democracy in 
the 2007 and 2008 elections for Chief Executive and the Legislative Council 
respectively. In 2005, it intervened again, at the request of then-acting Chief 
Executive Donald Tsang, to confirm that he would initially only serve the 
remaining two years of the departed Mr. Tung’s full term as his successor, 
rather than begin a full five-year term as clearly stipulated in the Basic Law. 
Although outrage over NPCSC interpretations did not disappear, it never 
again reached the level of 1999.11 That was true even in 2005 when, unlike 
on the two previous occasions, the NPCSC’s power of interpretation was 
explicitly used to halt a pending court case.12 Once again, what had been 
seen as an outrageous affront to the rule of law in the early years after the 
1997 handover was increasingly accepted, nearly a decade later, as a reality 
that—like it or not—the Hong Kong legal system would have to live with. 
Birth of a New Court 
Nor were there the same predictions about the death of the rule of law, a 
prediction which, as we’ve seen, turned out to have been much overused. 
The issue that had most exercised Mr. Lee and others back in 1995, an 
ambiguous definition of the “acts of state” that lie beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Hong Kong courts,13 turned out to be a non-issue. During the first decade 
of the HKSAR, not a single Chinese state-owned enterprise sought to exploit 
this ambiguity to escape the jurisdiction of local courts, as Mr. Lee and 
others had feared they would. The only defendant who tried to do this, a 
Hong Kong businessman jailed for false accounting in connection with his 
dealings with a Chinese-state owned enterprise, ended up being ushered out 
of the Court of Appeal by police after the court refused to entertain his 
argument that the case was covered by the act of state exemption.14 
It was a similar story when it came to the composition of the Court of 
Final Appeal—something which generated more controversy than almost 
any other legal issue in the run-up to July 1, 1997. Throughout much of the 
1990s, bitter arguments raged over China’s insistence on restricting the 
number of overseas judges who could be invited to sit on the new court to a 
maximum of one. That seemed to contravene the more flexible wording of 
Article 82 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which specifically referred to the 
court’s right to invite overseas “judges” in the plural. As a result, a first 
Sino-British agreement providing for such restrictions was rejected by the 
Legislative Council in 1991, and the legislation enacting a second such 
agreement only passed after a bitter debate in 1995. 
That meant the establishment of the court, which had originally been 
expected to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London 
as the final court for appeals on Hong Kong cases in the early 1990s, was 
delayed until July 1, 1997. This delay was accompanied by dire predictions 
that the restrictions on the court’s ability to invite overseas judges with 
experience of hearing final appeals elsewhere in the common-law world 
would render the new court almost still-born. 
Once again, such fears proved unfounded. The restrictions on the court’s 
composition have not stopped renowned overseas jurists from being invited 
to join the court for almost every case it has heard. Several have delivered 
leading judgments and made a sufficient impact to draw the ire of one 
prominent pro-China politician, who graphically denounced them as 
“parachute judges” in 2000.15 In any history of the first 10 years of the Hong 
Kong SAR, a special chapter must surely go to the successful establishment 
of the Court of Final Appeal in the face of such widespread skepticism, and 
the degree to which it has since cemented its reputation both at home as well 
as elsewhere in the common law world. 
Tensions with Beijing 
Where the critics were right is in forecasting that Beijing would have 
difficulty learning to live with a court that—unlike its counterparts on the 
mainland—takes seriously the concept of judicial independence. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it was probably unwise for the court to pick a fight with 
Beijing in the first case it heard concerning the Basic Law, especially over 
an issue that was not necessary to decide the case. Its January 1999 
declaration in the right of abode case of Ng Ka Ling v. Director of 
Immigration16 that the court had the power to invalidate actions of the 
National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee if they breached the 
Hong Kong Basic Law provoked the worst constitutional crisis yet seen in 
the history of the HKSAR.  
In the face of increasingly venomous attacks by Beijing and its local 
allies, who saw such this as an intolerable attack on the authority of highest 
sources of constitutional power in China, the court was forced to retreat. 
Setting aside all the normal rules about the finality of its decisions, the 
judges took the unprecedented step of elaborating on the subject a month 
later. Although not formally departing from the substance of its earlier 
position, that supplementary judgment contained sufficiently deferential 
language about the supremacy of the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee for Beijing to view it as an apology.17 
Further damage to the finality of its judgments swiftly followed. The 
court had also sought to enhance its authority by refusing to refer one of the 
substantive issues in the case to the NPCSC before delivering judgment, 
even though a literal reading of Article 158(3) of the Hong Kong Basic Law 
would have seemed to require it to do so. But the end result of such defiance 
was to undermine its authority instead. Arguing that Hong Kong would be 
unable to cope with the mass influx of mainland migrants that the court’s 
judgment would allegedly bring, Mr. Tung simply asked the NPCSC to 
intervene after the case was over. 
That June, 1999 interpretation not only overruled parts of the court’s 
ruling,18 but also established the NPCSC’s right to interpret any part of the 
Basic Law at any time, including those provisions which are supposed to fall 
within Hong Kong’s autonomy. A chastened court was, by this time, in no 
position to resist, accepting that it was bound by NPCSC’s unlimited power 
to interpret the Basic Law in Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration19 
six months later. That rapid retreat was memorably described by Professor 
Jerome Cohen of New York University, a long-standing expert on the 
Chinese legal system, as the court veering from being “unnecessarily 
provocative” to the opposite extreme of having “unnecessarily prostrated 
itself before Beijing” within less than a year.20 
That impression was reinforced two weeks later when the court ducked 
another confrontation with Beijing over a localized version of a mainland 
law criminalizing desecration of the national flag.21 A lower court had held 
this law violated the human-rights protections in the Basic Law. But, citing 
then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin, the Court of Final Appeal took a 
different view, adopting an expansive view of the permissible restrictions on 
such civil liberties in the case of HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu.22 
But predictions that the court’s authority had been fatally undermined 
proved premature. Instead, the judges were simply waiting for tensions with 
Beijing to cool. By 2001, the court was showing fresh signs of confidence. 
In Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen,23 it again ruled in favor of 
mainlanders seeking the right of abode and refused to apply the NPCSC’s 
earlier interpretation on the grounds that this case involved a different sub-
section of the right of abode provisions in the Basic Law.24 That provoked 
an angry retort from Beijing. But, in contrast to the events of 1999, no action 
was taken to overrule the effects of the judgment—so chalking up a much-
needed victory for the court. 
By 2005, the court was firmly back in its stride, taking an expansive view 
of civil liberties rather than the restrictions on them. In Leung Kwok Hung v. 
HKSAR, it sided with one of Beijing’s most vehement critics in striking out 
of the Public Order Ordinance the same reason for restricting freedom of 
assembly that it had accepted as justification for outlawing desecration of the 
national flag six years earlier.25 Far from citing from President Jiang, in 
Yeung May Wan v HKSAR26 the court defended the right of Falun Gong 
followers in Hong Kong to protest the oppression he had unleashed against 
them—even chiding a lower court for taking too long to decide the case. 
As a result of cases such as this, few would deny that, after some initial 
wobbles, the protection of Hong Kong’s civil liberties is now in safe hands 
as far as the Court of Final Appeal is concerned. The court’s readiness even 
to defend the rights of Falun Gong protesters is particularly striking. Banned 
on the mainland since 1999, the group’s continued activities in Hong Kong 
were one of the most persistent sources of tension with Beijing during the 
first decade of the HKSAR. 
Mixed Track Record 
The Falun Gong issue also highlights the gulf between the judiciary’s 
determination to uphold the rule of law and the executive branch of the 
Hong Kong government’s more mixed record on this front during this first 
decade. From denouncing the Falun Gong as an “evil cult” to barring many 
of its followers from entering Hong Kong, the government’s emphasis was 
on placating Beijing rather than upholding the group’s continued right to 
exist in Hong Kong under one country, two systems. 
The nadir came in 2002, when a provision that would have allowed Hong 
Kong authorities to ban the Falun Gong was slipped into proposals 
ostensibly aimed at implementing Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
Never mind that Article 23, which stipulates specific offences such as 
treason, subversion, secession and sedition, contains nothing requiring such 
a ban.27 Or that the proposal, by allowing any ban imposed on an 
organization on national-security grounds on the mainland to be replicated 
against affiliated bodies in Hong Kong,28 ran the risk of importing the 
mainland’s harsh definitions of national security—and suppression of 
peaceful protests—into Hong Kong.29 
Being able to ban Beijing’s critics was considered so crucial that the 
Tung administration refused to back down for nine long months,30 greatly 
contributing to the mounting opposition against the Article 23 legislation as 
a whole. Only after more than half a million people took to the streets on 
July 1, 2003, in a protest triggered by a combination of concern about the 
proposed legislation and general dissatisfaction with the Tung administration, 
did it finally agree to abandon this particular proposal. By that stage, the 
government no longer had enough votes in the Legislative Council to pass 
the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, leaving no choice but to 
indefinitely postpone efforts to enact Article 23 legislation. 
Nor was this an isolated example of the Hong Kong government’s 
questionable commitment to the rule of law during the first decade of the 
Hong Kong SAR. Ms. Leung, who served as Secretary for Justice from 1997 
to 2005, repeatedly caused concern by refusing to prosecute in politically-
sensitive cases. As a result, the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua news agency, 
which had long served as Beijing’s main representative office in Hong Kong, 
went unpunished in 1998 for a breach of the Personal Data (Privacy 
Ordinance).31 So too did former Financial Secretary Antony Leung, after he 
resigned in disgrace in 2003 over his purchase of a Lexus saloon shortly 
before raising the tax on luxury cars in the annual budget. 
None of these decisions caused more concern than another refusal to 
prosecute in 1998, this time of Sally Aw, the chairman of Sing Tao 
Publishing Group, over a circulation fraud at the Hong Kong Standard, one 
of the papers owned by her group. Ms. Aw, a member of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, was friendly with the Tung 
family. Ms. Leung only made matters worse when she sought to defend her 
decision two years later, by arguing that prosecuting Ms. Aw could her led 
to the collapse of her group’s newspapers. That left the perception of one 
law for ordinary people and another law for newspaper owners, and 
prompted a no-confidence motion against Ms. Leung in the Legislative 
Council that was only narrowly defeated. 
Perhaps most damaging of all was the government’s willingness to invite 
interference in the local legal system by seeking interpretations of the Basic 
Law from the NPCSC. Although much of the outrage may have died down 
by 2005, in many respects that year’s interpretation was the most troubling 
of all. For the first time, the Hong Kong government explicitly discarded the 
common-law principles of interpretation used by the courts, in favor of 
instead interpreting parts of the Basic Law according to the more flexible 
principles that apply under the mainland legal system.32 
That allowed the government to fall in line with Beijing’s wishes33 and 
overcame the obstacle of giving an initial two-year term to Mr. Tung’s 
successor when Article 46 of the Basic Law clearly stipulated a five-year 
term. But it did so at the price of raising questions about which legal system 
the Hong Kong government was now committed to protecting and what 
fundamental rights might end up being restricted if the provisions on civil 
liberties in the Basic Law were now also interpreted according to the 
mainland’s more flexible rules.34 
Cautious Optimism 
Despite all these troubling developments, by the end of the first decade of 
the HKSAR it was possible to be cautiously optimistic about the Hong 
Kong’s government’s commitment to the rule of law. The change in Chief 
Executive that prompted the row over whether Mr. Tsang should initially 
serve a two- or five-year term was followed within a few months by Ms. 
Leung’s departure as Secretary for Justice. The appointment of politically 
low-profile barrister Wong Yan Lung as her successor brought rare praise 
from the democratic camp, who remembered Mr. Wong’s presence on 
protests against previous NPCSC interpretations, and welcomed his repeated 
declarations that he hoped there would be no more such interpretations in 
future.35 
Since then, controversies over legal issues have been rare. When 
challenged in the courts over the lack of proper regulation of covert 
electronic surveillance of criminal suspects, the government—instead of 
asking the NPCSC to intervene—introduced a bill that, for the first time in 
Hong Kong’s history, ensured that bugging and telephone tapping would be 
regulated by law.36 Learning from their mistake in the “Big Spender” case, 
the government also asked mainland authorities to return the Luk Yu 
teahouse suspects to stand trial in Hong Kong. However, it then proceeded 
to defend Beijing’s rejection of this request in a telling reminder of where 
real power lies in determining the fate of its legal system.37 
From insisting on exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed in Hong 
Kong to the NPCSC’s repeated interpretations of the Basic Law, mainland 
authorities played a major role in many low points for the rule of law during 
the decade. Yet credit must also go to Beijing for avoiding the worst 
excesses that had been the subject of those pre-1997 apocalyptic predictions. 
The Chinese state-owned companies whom Mr. Lee and others had 
feared would use “acts of state” exemption to escape the jurisdiction of the 
Hong Kong courts would doubtless have been only too happy to try had they 
been given the green light to do so by Beijing. So too would the People’s 
Liberation Army garrison in Hong Kong, whose legal status was another 
cause of much pre-handover concern. Instead, in March 2006, the garrison 
allowed one of its soldiers to be tried and convicted in Tsuen Wan 
Magistrates’ court after he was caught stealing a key ring at Hong Kong 
Disneyland.38 
In a more positive sense, Beijing deserves credit for allowing the 2005 
appointment as Secretary for Justice of a friend of the pro-democracy camp 
and opponent of previous NPCSC interpretations.39 Such an appointment 
would have been unthinkable only a few years earlier, when mainland 
authorities were publicly demanding that the Secretary for Justice and other 
Hong Kong officials follow their lead in banning the Falun Gong. 
But the Chinese leaders that acquiesced in Mr. Tsang’s choice as 
Secretary for Justice, as well as his own replacement of Mr. Tung as Chief 
Executive earlier in 2005, came from a different generation than those 
responsible for those earlier denunciations.40 Just as expectations have 
changed in Hong Kong over the past decade, it is also possible to see signs 
of a change in perceptions on the other side of the border. 
The lack of reaction to the Court of Final’s more recent rulings suggests a 
recognition that, like it or not, Beijing has learnt to live with the reality of an 
independent judiciary in Hong Kong. Perhaps, too, at a time when Chinese 
leaders are increasingly talking about the need to build respect for rule of 
law on the mainland, they realize that it ill behooves them to undermine the 
same concept in Hong Kong. 
In coming years, the future of Hong Kong’s separate legal system will 
continue to depend as much on events in Beijing as it did during the 
HKSAR’s first decade. But, judging from the events of the past few years, 
there are good grounds for at least modest optimism. 
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